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Abstract: 
Electricity systems have generally evolved based on the natural resources available 
locally. Few metrics exist to compare the security of electricity supply of different 
countries despite the increasing likelihood of potential shocks to the power system 
like energy price increases and carbon price regulation. This paper seeks to calculate 
a robust measure of national power system resilience by analysing each step in the 
process of transformation from raw energy to consumed electricity. Countries with 
sizeable deposits of mineral resources are used for comparison because of the need 
for electricity-intensive metals processing. We find that shifts in electricity-intensive 
industry can be predicted based on countries’ power system resilience. 
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1. Introduction 
Resilience is a widely used term and can be found, for example, in the disciplines of 
ecology, psychology, economics and engineering. Definitions are adapted to suit the 
particular area of study, but one of the original proponents of the concept, C. S 
Holling, described it as “a measure of the persistence of systems and of their ability 
to absorb change and disturbances and still maintain the same relationships 
between populations or state variables.”(Holling, 1973 p14). He also observed that 
systems that were subjected to large fluctuations and functional group variety, 
showed increased levels of resilience. More recent studies now include the 
requirement that keystone processes in the system interact, and even overlap, in an 
apparently redundant way to ensure resilience (Folke et al., 2002). However, 
survival of a system depends not only on a reserve of flexible actions to meet the 
challenges of novel disturbances, but also its ability to  maintain integrity: in other 
words, achieve efficiency (Ulanowicz et al., 2009). From these definitions, we can 
identify the key attributes of resilience as the capacities to absorb variation through 
efficiency, diversity, and redundancy.  
The national electricity systems of today are, like ecosystems, integrated networks 
of keystone processes that interact with each other to provide services to 
communities. Moreover, power systems are fundamental components of the 
economic systems of each country, which are integrated networks of financial 
transactions that interact with each other and make economic activity possible. 
Robust electricity systems are, therefore, critical for the effective functioning of 
economies. Economic losses can be induced by power fluctuations and associated 3 
 
blackouts. Evidence of such losses and their magnitude is well documented 
(MacNamara, 2008, Faruqui et al., 2001) .  To minimize the impact of disruptions to 
the economy, it is therefore important for electricity systems to display the 
attributes that yield an acceptable level of resilience.  
The evolution of electricity systems has been based on the supply of local resources 
and the limited ability to shift the production of electricity offshore. So, few metrics 
exist to compare the security of electricity supply of different countries other than 
measures of each country’s diversity of fuel source.  Indeed, energy security only 
came under serious scrutiny after the oil crises in the 1970s in the global economic 
fall-out that ensued. Energy security remains a challenging concept with discussion 
ongoing to define and measure it. But for electricity systems, with the possibility of 
substantial energy price increases, coupled with the potential that carbon pricing 
will become widespread, it is increasingly important to be able to assess the extent 
of their security and vulnerability.   
Attempting to measure the resilience of vastly different electricity systems is 
challenging, but it is argued here that if each step of the process of transformation 
from raw energy to consumed electricity is measured using non-subjective metrics, 
and the basic premises of resilience are adhered to, then, from a high level 
perspective, vulnerability to stochastic events can be measured and compared. In 
addition, providing countries with trends in resilience metrics, of both their own 
systems and of countries that may be competing for electricity intensive industry 
investments, will be valuable for strategic planning.  In this paper, we define a 4 
 
composite resilience metric and then consider whether shifts in electricity-intensive 
industry can be predicted, based on the power system’s resilience. 
Section 2 introduces non-subjective metrics for analysis of resilience and the 
aggregation of those metrics into a composite Resilience Index. Section 3 analyses 
the sensitivity of the Resilience Index to changes in high level assumptions. Section 
4 discusses the role of electricity price in comparing country performance. Section 5 
reviews recent discussions on the measurement of energy security and compares 
the Resilience Index, as defined for use in the case of electricity, to proposals for 
energy security measurement. Evidence of the Resilience Index’s ability to predict 
shifts in electricity-intensive industry is discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Resilience metrics and the composite Resilience Index 
Resilience is the ability to absorb shocks and still retain function. For electricity 
systems, shocks could come in the form of physical shortages of fuel, global fuel 
price rises, the introduction of environmental regulation, physical shortages of 
imported electricity, and unplanned surges in demand.  A resilient electricity system 
therefore should provide evidence of: efficiency, to conserve resources and 
minimize costs; diversity, to reduce the risk associated with the supply of any one 
fuel type; spare capacity or redundancy, to allow for unplanned surges in demand 
or the loss of electricity from any one source; and security, where the electricity 
system is reliant on sources outside of national borders. The efficiency measures 
serve to cap costs whilst the diversity, redundancy and security measures are each 
in some way proxies for reliability. A highly resilient system will present a low risk of 
failure and future price escalation and vice versa. 5 
 
Countries for comparison have been selected if they have sizeable deposits of 
bauxite, copper or iron ore.  The rationale behind this is that these countries will 
have a requirement for a robust, resilient electricity system in order to be able to 
process the metals that are locally mined. The only variations to this selection 
criteria are the inclusions of Japan, Korea and OECD Europe because Japan is the 3
rd 
largest refiner of copper and steel despite having no deposits of the metal ores to 
speak of, and Korea and OECD Europe also refine sizeable quantities of copper and 
steel. The resilience or otherwise of Japan, Korea and OECD Europe’s electricity 
systems might provide insight into their ability to attract electricity-intensive 
industry. The countries chosen for comparison then are: Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, China, India, Japan, Korea, Russia, South Africa, the United States and OECD 
Europe.  The GDP of these countries and the group OECD Europe together comprise 
77% of world GDP and their power consumption comprises 81% of world power 
consumption. 
The primary source of the data is the International Energy Agency (IEA) and US 
Geological Survey. If heat is generated directly for consumption, a notional quantity 
of kWh is calculated and added to electricity kWh generated, to create a notional 
power total in kWh.  This is important in the case of Russia where heat is a 
substantial source of power for the country. In a few cases, where the data are 
missing from the IEA tables, other sources including the World Bank, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, United Nations, and the Energy Information 
Administration are used. Using these data, we have identified seven key indicators 
of resilience which we shall introduce in turn. 6 
 
2.1.  Non-renewable fuel used in generation 
Rather than attempt to predict production, reserve and consumption levels, this 
metric provides evidence of the degree of dependence on reserves of fuels that 
may become depleted.  Whilst individual countries may have access to extremely 
large reserves, if global reserves decline, then scarcity will increase the value of 
those reserves, leading to increased cost of generation. Therefore, it measures how 
vulnerable the electricity system is to substantial shifts related to non-renewable 
fuels. The metric is calculated as tons of oil equivalent (toe) of coal, gas, oil and 
nuclear used in power generation, per kWh consumed. As can be seen from Figure 
1, India is the most reliant on non-renewable fuels for its electricity, using 347 toe 
per kWh consumed in 2009.  South Africa also has a high dependence on non-
renewable fuels, using 322 toe per kWh, followed by Australia which consumes 274 
toe per kWh. At the other end of the spectrum, Brazil consumed a mere 29 toe per 
kWh, providing evidence of low dependence on non-renewable fuels for its 
electricity needs.  
2.2.  Generation efficiency 
Figure 1: Non-renewable fuel use 
Source: (IEA, 2011d) 7 
 
In order to measure the efficiency of non-renewable fuel generation, the quantity 
of energy input into generation, in million tons of oil equivalent (mtoe), versus the 
quantity of energy generated in mtoe, is used as a measure of the efficiency of 
generation. 
As can be seen from Figure 2, Russia is the most efficient generator in the group.  
This is a result of having a high proportion of gas (60%), which is generally more 
efficient than coal, in the power mix but it is also because using heat as a direct 
source of power increases the efficiency of generation by eliminating losses in 
conversion. Although OECD Europe has a lower ratio of gas (26%) in the power mix, 
it too enjoys greater efficiency in generation than the rest of the group.  India, on 
the other hand, sources 69% of its power from coal and, coupled with an old 
generation fleet, falls short in generation efficiency at 27%. 
However, measuring generation efficiency provides only a limited comparative 
metric since countries like Brazil have little reliance on non-renewable generation 
whereas a country like Russia is the opposite.. So the generation efficiency measure 
Figure 2: Non-renewable fuel generation efficiency 
Source: (IEA, 2011d) 8 
 
that we use is weighted to reflect the relative importance of the non-renewable 
generation fleet. 
2.3. Distribution efficiency 
The gap between consumption and generation (in mtoe) measures efficiency in the 
distribution of electricity. This measure includes not only transmission and 
distribution losses but also the amount of electricity consumed by the energy 
industry for its own use, including auxiliary use for generators, and mining and 
refining of fuels.  
Figure 3 shows the losses through distribution for each country. Within the group, 
geography, climate, resources and settlement offer very different challenges and 
opportunities for electricity supply. Higher losses in Russia are understandable due 
to its large mining industry and huge landmass, but Russia’s very size, which sprawls 
across 11 time zones, provides opportunities for spreading peak loads and thus 
reduces its generation requirements. The huge losses evidenced by India have few 
redeeming qualities in that they are due to multiple problems including theft 
Figure 3: Distribution efficiency (and landmass) 
Source: (IEA, 2011d, WorldBank, 2011b) 9 
 
through illegal tapping, faulty meters, overloading distribution at peak demand and 
a very high ratio of low voltage to high voltage line kilometers (Remme et al., 2011).  
Losses or uses through the transformation process remain an area worth focusing 
on to improve the efficiency of the system and will reflect appropriately on the 
comparative resilience of the power system 
2.4. Carbon intensity of generation 
The prospect of climate change has added a new threat to electricity systems 
heavily dependent on fossil fuels. High emissions of carbon dioxide from power 
generation could substantially add to generation costs if carbon pricing or 
environmental regulation is introduced. Therefore the carbon intensity of 
generation is a good metric for this threat. We use tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (tCO2e) from power generation per KWh generated.  
Carbon intensity is high in countries with a high proportion of coal-fueled 
generation which is why India, South Africa and Japan have the highest quantity of 
carbon dioxide emissions per kWh generated. Whilst this measure is similar to the 
Figure 4: Carbon intensity of generation 
Source: (IEA, 2011d) 10 
 
measure of non-renewable fuel use, it is separately included because it represents a 
completely different threat to non-renewable fuel supply constraints.  
2.5.  Diversity of generation 
“No matter how great the resources, nor how complete the knowledge, 
nor how sophisticated the decision making process, only fools put all 
their eggs in one basket.”(Stirling, 1994,p196) 
Diversity indices are often used in energy security calculations and are considered a 
good way of hedging against unforeseen supply risks (Kruyt et al., 2009) and 
mitigating against technological lock-in (Sovacool, 2011). 
Diversity of generation here is measured as the probability that the next watt of 
electricity will be generated from a different fuel type.  It is calculated as 
 
 (                   )       ∑  
 
   
  
(1)   
Where: 
N = number of different fuel types 
S = proportion of generation from each fuel type 
Figure 5 provides a comparison of the diversity of generation in the selected 
countries. Physical shortages of fuel are not only related to non-renewable fuels. 
For instance, in 2000, after decades of drought, hydro-electric reservoir levels in 
Brazil reached such low levels that electricity supply had to be rationed (IEA, 2006).  
As Brazil’s experience highlights, too much reliance on a single source of energy, can 
render the power system vulnerable to unexpected constraints which have an 
impact not only on the supply of electricity but also on the economy. Brazil’s 11 
 
diversity index in 1990 was 0.14 where in 2009 it had increased to 0.29, indicating a 
shift toward greater diversity after realizing the consequences of a lack of it. 
South Africa, on the other hand, has shown no shift toward greater diversity, 
remaining almost entirely dependent on coal for its electricity generation. The 
South African power system is extremely vulnerable to shocks associated with the 
burning of coal.  
In order to avoid the impact of damaging shocks to the power system, a resilient 
power system should display evidence of diverse use of fuel types in the supply of 
electricity.  
2.6. Redundant power for use in GDP 
In general, the concept of redundancy does not sit comfortably with the concept of 
efficiency. They are however slightly different concepts since efficiency requires 
organization to ensure improvement and the avoidance of waste, whereas 
redundancy assumes capacity to respond to stochastic events. A recent model 
developed to quantify system sustainability returned to information theory (IT) to 
support biologists’ views that the absence of something can be critical in ensuring 
Figure 5: Diversity of generation 
Source: (IEA, 2011d) 12 
 
the survival of a living system. It starts by defining ‘surprisal’(the surprise at seeing 
an event) to gauge what ‘p’ (the probability of an event) is not, develops the 
‘capacity for evolution’ to represent both a regular, efficient component and an 
irregular, incoherent, disorderly component, and ends with a calculation for what it 
calls ‘robustness’ that highlights the necessary role of reserve capacities in 
sustaining ecosystems. Its results point to the potential for non-participating groups 
to wither and disappear in systems that have maximized efficiency, resulting in 
monist systems which are vulnerable to collapse. What then becomes clear is that it 
is the very absence of order that makes it possible for a system to persist in the long 
run (Ulanowicz et al., 2009).   For these reasons, we highlight the importance of 
redundancy for establishing the resilience of electricity systems. 
Most electricity systems already have reserve margins to address peak load surges 
in demand, but redundancy needs to address more than time of delivery issues. 
There needs to be redundancy in the system to ensure that whole sectors, like the 
transport sector, can be accommodated should there be a substantial shift to 
electrification (for instance due to oil price spikes or perhaps the introduction of 
environmental regulations) or if one source of power becomes untenable, there 
needs to be sufficient alternative capacity to fill the gap and maintain a reasonably-
functioning system.  
Measuring spare capacity in a power system is complex, but generally available 
information has been used and few subjective parameters have been introduced.  It 
is calculated as total kWh possible at capacity less kWh generated.  Total kWhs 
possible for coal, gas, nuclear and geothermal generators are assumed to have a 13 
 
potential 90% capacity. Oil generators are often located in remote, off-grid 
locations or are used for back-up, so are assumed to have a potential of 50% 
capacity. Wind, solar, ocean and biomass are assumed to always operate at capacity 
due to their low short-run marginal costs. Hydro generation is subject to many 
localized factors making it difficult to assess maximum capacity. However it is false 
to claim that hydro power offers no spare capacity.  Like hydro generation, too little 
information about heat generation is available to assess spare capacity. For these 
reasons, it is assumed that hydro-power and heat always have 20% in reserve.  
It is understood that this metric has limits in terms of its ability to measure the age, 
condition and location of assets, but these are the limits of aggregation. It is also 
recognized that the spare capacity measurement for power systems with a high 
percentage of generation from renewable sources is crudely calculated.  Using the 
‘maximum capacity’ rules of thumb associated with non-renewable fuel generation 
recognizes that energy is stored in the form of coal, oil, gas or uranium until 
converted into electricity, as required.  However, there are currently no ‘maximum 
capacity’ rules of thumb associated with generation from renewable energy, as 
storage for future use is not available or not measured. The only form of utility scale 
storage associated with renewable energy available today is in dams and pumped 
storage, but this data is not generally available. As utility scale storage (in the form 
of molten salt,  heated basalt, steam, air pressure, batteries, hydrogen, methane or 
super conducting coils) are deployed at significant scale to store the energy from 
renewable sources, it will be essential that this data is measured. Therefore an 
improved measure of spare capacity in power systems driven by renewable energy 14 
 
could include the quantity of storage available versus the quantity of electricity 
dispatched from storage. If this data is universally measured and reported by the 
IEA, then this metric could be substantially enhanced. 
Whilst calculating spare capacity provides a measure of redundancy, this in no way 
reflects the potential requirements of the economy.  For this reason, spare capacity 
is then aligned with GDP to establish the number of spare kWh’s available for use in 
the economy.  GDP is represented in constant 2005 international dollars. 
 
Figure 6 compared the chosen countries on the basis of this measure of 
redundancy. Russia shows a good measure of spare capacity available for use in the 
economy, as does China, but India shows little spare capacity. Russia’s considerable 
spare capacity could be viewed as a byproduct of inefficiency, but if it is 
remembered that Russia has been subjected to substantial political and economic 
upheavals since the breakup of the Soviet Union, and that from 1975 to 2005 there 
was not a single blackout (Makarov et al., 2005), its resilience as a power system 
becomes evident.  In 2006, South Africa’s lack of investment provided a salient 
lesson on the consequences of no redundancy. Failed market reforms and a lack of 
Figure 6: Redundant power for use in GDP 
Source: (IEA, 2011d, WorldBank, 2011b, OECD/IAEA, 2009, IEA, 2011c, IEA, 2011a) 
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strategic planning meant that generation capacity failed to increase in line with 
consumption. The reserve margin slipped below 5% resulting in mandatory load 
shedding which by 2008 had deteriorated into a national electricity crisis. The 
electricity crisis has been estimated to have reduced economic growth by at least a 
half percent (MacNamara, 2008).  The consequences for consumers were not only 
rationed supply but sudden substantial increases in price. In real terms, the price of 
electricity to industry had fallen between 1990 and 2008, but it increased by 54% 
between 2008 and 2010. 
Redundancy is therefore important for ensuring reliability and meeting economic 
requirements, and has the added benefit of reducing price volatility resulting from 
sharp adjustments when mechanisms have failed to deliver adequate capacity. 
2.7.  Reliance on imports 
Where countries’ electricity systems are dependent on imports, the security of 
those systems are affected by the stability of the countries supplying those imports.  
Reliance on imports is therefore calculated as the quantity of kWh that are 
generated from imported sources plus the net electricity that is imported, as a 
 
Figure 7: % of electricity generated from imports 
Source: (IEA, 2011d, OECD/IAEA, 2009) 16 
 
proportion of the total gWh supplied.  
As can be seen in figure 7, Korea and Japan are dependent on imports for 97% and 
89% respectively of their electricity. That is a substantial risk to the electricity 
system. Canada, on the other hand, has net exports of 6% of its generation, 
providing it with a good source of income and no risk to its power system 
associated with imports (except for the risk associated with interconnection, as the 
blackout experienced in tandem with the USA in August 2003 (IEA, 2005) showed).  
Consideration has been given to whether this measure should be weighted by the 
stability level of the countries supplying either the fuels or the electricity. The major 
concern with weighting based on stability, is that any measure of stability be it the 
World Bank’s ‘Political Stability’ or the UNDP’s ‘Human Development Indicator’, is 
based on metrics, often subjective, that can change very quickly. A current example 
is the political stability of Libya which in 2008 was calculated as being above the 70
th 
percentile (WorldBank, 2011a) but by 2011 Libya had descended into chaos. 
Historical trends in political stability may not be a reliable indicator of future 
political stability. The World Bank itself disclaims that the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators reflect its official view or that the indicators are used to allocate 
resources, which calls into doubt the use of these indicators to adjust for political 
stability.   
Does political stability point to potential supply issues related to increased demand 
in the exporting country? A case in point was Chile’s reliance on gas imports from 
Argentina to hedge against hydro-electricity shortfalls (like those experienced after 
a prolonged drought which depleted reservoir levels and resulted in an electricity 17 
 
crisis in 1999/2000). When Argentina experienced increased domestic demand for 
gas, it met domestic demand in preference to servicing Chile’s requirements, 
resulting in electricity shortages for Chile in 2007/8. Whilst Argentina’s political 
stability indicator had moved from the 34
th percentile in 2003 to the 47
th percentile 
in 2005, political instability was not the prime cause of the supply constraint for 
Chile.    
For these reasons, this measure is not adjusted for the perceived political stability 
or otherwise of the countries that supply fuels or electricity for the power system. 
Relying on imports therefore is seen as a risk irrespective of the source of the 
imports. 
2.8.  The composite Resilience Index 
2.8.1.  Transforming the raw metrics into unit-free indices 
Each of the seven raw metrics mentioned above is transformed into a unit-free 
index between 0 and 1 as follows: 
 
         
       ( )
   ( )         ( )
  (2)   
Where    ( ) and    ( ) are the worst of the group less 10% and the best of the 
group plus 10%. These endogenous thresholds are used in preference to subjective 
predictions of acceptable minima and maxima for each of the metrics. 
2.8.2.  Weighting generation efficiency for non-renewable fuel dependence 
The generation efficiency index is transformed as in 2.8.1 above, but to adjust for 
non-renewable fuel dependence, the percentage of generation from non-
renewable sources is also transformed into a unit-free index between 0 and 1.  18 
 
Generation efficiency index weighted for non-renewable dependence is then 
calculated as follows: 
      √   
    (3)   
where:  
b = generation efficiency weighted for non-renewable dependence index 
m = generation efficiency index 
n = proportion of generation from non-renewable sources index 
 
2.8.3.  Calculating the composite index 
The composite index is the geometric mean of the seven normalised indices as 
follows: 
                      √             
    (4)   
where: 
a = non-renewable fuel used index 
b = generation efficiency weighted for non-renewable fuel dependence index 
c = distribution efficiency index 
d = carbon intensity index 
e = diversity index 
f = redundant electricity for use in GDP index 
g = reliance on imports index 
 
2.8.4.  The Resilience Index results 
Figure 8 shows the Resilience Index results for the group. In general, countries with 
a high proportion of hydro (Canada, Brazil and Chile) show higher levels of 
resilience, followed by countries with an even mix of coal, gas and nuclear (OECD 
Europe and Japan). The USA and Russia also show good levels of resilience despite 
having the majority of their electricity sourced from fossil fuels, as a result of 
Russia’s use of gas which provides an efficient source of power and the USA’s 
efficient distribution system and diversity of fuel supply. 19 
 
Countries with high reliance on coal for electricity supply, show evidence of 
decreasing levels of resilience. 
3. Sensitivity analysis 
The robustness of the Resilience Index was tested for sensitivity to coverage, 
sensitivity to individual metrics and sensitivity to an individual metric. 
3.1. Sensitivity to outliers 
The normalization of metrics within the Resilience Index assumes that the metrics 
for the countries selected are within 10% of global best and worst metrics; i.e., they 
cover 80% of possible outcomes. However, the countries selected may be outliers 
themselves or they may be far removed from outliers.  To test the sensitivity of the 
Resilience Index to outliers, we recalculated the metrics to assume that the 
countries chosen covered 90% and 70% of possible outcomes.  
This sensitivity analysis shows that South Africa and India are particularly sensitive 
to a change in assumption with respect to coverage, because they are generally the 
worst within the group.  Figure 9 shows the effect of changing the coverage 
Figure 8: Resilience Index results 
Source: (OECD/IAEA, 2009, IEA, 2011a, WorldBank, 2011b) 20 
 
assumption to 90
% and 70%. India and South Africa’s Resilience Index show 
substantial sensitivity to the changes possibly because they are the outliers.  
The same sensitivity to outliers is not evident amongst the countries that have 
metrics that are the best within the group. This is as a result of the fundamental 
function that the worst metric plays in the transformation to the unit-free indices.  
To demonstrate this relationship, countries’ metrics were compared to the worst in 
the group.  Also, the effect of a 15% increase on each country’s metrics was 
calculated. Where a 15% increase generated a more or less than 15% increase in the 
unit-free indices, this difference was calculated and is referred to as a multiplier. As 
can be seen in Figure 10, countries’ metrics that are furthest away from the worst 
metrics experience considerably smaller changes to their unit-free indices than 
Figure 9: Change in Resilience Index from outlier assumptions 21 
 
countries’ metrics that are closest to the worst metrics. 
 
The analysis shows that South Africa and India are particularly sensitive to changes 
in the coverage assumptions because they are likely to be the outliers. This can 
have an impact on their Resilience Index but not on their resilience ranking. There 
Figure 10: Multiplier effect of increase on each metric 
Figure 11: Sensitivity to change in outlier assumptions 22 
 
are a few small ranking changes between 80%, 90% and 70% coverage; the only one 
of any significance is where Russia and the USA exchange places at 90% coverage 
because the Russian distribution metric approaches the worst metric and thus is 
subjected to a substantial multiplier which impacts on its index. As can be seen in 
figure 11, the Resilience Index, as a comparative indication of vulnerability to a 
variety of shocks, remains robust when subjected to changes in the coverage 
assumptions. 
3.2. Sensitivity to changes in raw metrics 
Having  established  that  South  Africa  and  India  were  the  outliers,  a  mid-ranking 
country was chosen to establish the impact of perturbations within each country’s 
raw metrics. China’s power system resilience is ranked 7
th amongst the comparative 
countries. Its power system has grown, and is projected to grow, faster than any 
other country’s system, so it would be useful to understand the impact of changes 
to  each  of  its  raw  metrics.  Figure  12  shows  each  of  China’s  individual  metrics’ 
sensitivity  to  the  worst  country  metric.  Its  generation  efficiency  (weighted  for 
Figure 12: China's individual metrics’ sensitivity to change 23 
 
dependence on non-renewable fuels) is 0.76 of the worst metric, making China’s 
Resilience Index particularly sensitive to changes in generation efficiency.  
Figure  13  demonstrates  the  effect  of  15%,  25%  and  35%  improvements  and 
deteriorations  within  each  of  the  raw  metrics.  Because  generation  efficiency  is 
closest to the worst country metric, it shows the greatest sensitivity to changes in 
the raw metric. At the other end of the scale, China shows almost no sensitivity to 
security issues with respect to imports. 
If China wished to improve its power system resilience, it should start with 
improving the generation efficiency of its fleet.  
However, generation efficiency is weighted for dependence on non-renewable 
fuels, so both of these metrics, in addition to all other raw metrics, were analysed 
with respect to their impact on the composite Resilience Index. Because China is 
heavily reliant on non-renewable forms of generation, its proportion of generation 
from non-renewable sources is close to the worst country metric at 0.86 
Figure 13: Effect of raw metric changes on China's unit free indices 24 
 
(generation efficiency is at 0.67 to the worst metric), so it creates the greatest 
change to perturbations (although the change is capped when 100% generation is 
reached). Figure 14 provides some detail on the impact on the Resilience Index to 
changes in each raw metric. 
As can be seen in Figure 14, a 15% improvement in all raw metrics, results in a 
greater than 15% improvement to the Resilience Index although those metrics that 
are closest to worst provide greater improvement. For instance, a 15% 
improvement in only the non-renewable percentage of generation creates a 5% 
improvement in the Resilience Index. This would have corresponding benefits in 
carbon intensity and non-renewable fuel used which would compound the 
Figure 14: % Change to RI from change in raw metrics 25 
 
improvement to the Resilience Index. Improvement in distribution efficiency too 
would result in a noticeable improvement in China’s Resilience Index. 
China’s power system resilience ranking doesn’t experience dramatic change when 
all countries experience changes of 15%, 25% and 35% to raw metrics; it moves 
slightly between 7
th and 6
th ranking.  This highlights that all countries’ raw metrics 
contribute to each country’s relative performance, and each year will see changes 
to the Resilience Index from raw metric movements.  
The Resilience Index shows a robust, predictable response to changes in the raw 
metrics. 
3.3. Sensitivity to an individual measure 
It was noted in the previous section that non-renewable fuel usage, carbon 
emission intensity and generation efficiency exhibit similar responses to 
perturbations in the raw metrics. The inclusion of non-renewable fuel usage is 
intended to measure vulnerability to fuel price rises, whilst generation efficiency is 
included to measure the effectiveness of the generation fleet. It is therefore 
important to establish the relationship between non-renewable fuel usage and 
generation efficiency, and furthermore to establish the sensitivity of the Resilience 
Index to removing the generation efficiency measure from the calculation. 
Figure 15 shows the positive linear relationship between non-renewable fuel usage 
and generation efficiency (weighted for proportion of non-renewable generation). 
Korea shows evidence of a weaker relationship as a result of its extremely high 26 
 
proportion of non-renewable generation counterbalanced by a relatively efficient 
generation fleet. 
To establish the sensitivity of the Resilience Index to an unintended weighting in 
favour of non-renewable fuel usage, the generation efficiency metric is removed 
from the Resilience Index calculation, and the impact of the removal assessed. 
Figure 16 shows the Resilience Index calculated to include generation efficiency and 
to exclude it.  
All countries (except Brazil) experience an increase to their Resilience Index as a 
 Figure 15: Relationship between generation efficiency and non-renewable fuel usage 
Figure 16: Resilience Index with and without generation efficiency 27 
 
result of removing the generation efficiency measure of between 3 and 19%; the 
size of the increase dependent on the efficiency and dependence on non-renewable 
generation. All countries except the USA and China maintain their comparative 
Resilience Index ranking. The USA and China have a relatively high proportion of 
generation sourced from non-renewable fuels which depresses their Resilience 
Index – removal of the generation efficiency metric, gives their Resilience Index a 
boost.  
With small, predictable perturbations resulting from removing the generation 
efficiency metric from the Resilience Index calculation, the Resilience Index can be 
considered to be robust to the removal of the generation efficiency metric.  
The Resilience Index was tested for sensitivity to changes in the coverage 
assumptions, individual metric changes and the removal of a metric and found to be 
robust and predictable under all the tests.  
4. The role of electricity price in comparing country 
performance 
In comparing power systems, price is fundamental as a value metric.  But rather 
than wrap price into the Resilience Index, it is mapped to the Resilience Index, and 
in so doing, provides the cost associated with each country’s power system.  Firms 
considering the location of electricity-intensive industry will use, not only the future 
stability of the power system but also, the projected cost of that system, as key 
decision variables. For this reason, the price of electricity to industry is used as the 
value metric. 28 
 
Comparing locally based electricity prices, presents a few challenges in terms of 
international values.  Manipulated currencies can distort the value represented, 
which leads many to use purchase price parity for international comparisons. 
However, since we are attempting to establish comparisons to underpin electricity 
intensive investment, firms will be comparing profits in US$, so prices are measured 
in 2010 US$.  
 
The comparison provides a few surprises.  For instance, Canada which shows high 
resilience is also extremely competitive in terms of price, with Russia and the USA 
also displaying competitiveness. Brazil, Chile and OECD Europe are resilient but the 
cost of electricity in those countries reduces their attractiveness.  South Africa 
produces incredibly cheap electricity but the power system is vulnerable to multiple 
threats from its reliance on a single source of fuel, to its emissions of carbon 
dioxide, and its lack of spare capacity to fuel the economy.  
Figure 17: Power system competitiveness 
Source: (IEA, 2011b) WorldBank 2011b, IAEA 2009) 29 
 
5. Recent energy security discussions 
Energy security discussions have focused on the notion that an uninterrupted 
supply of energy is critical for the effective functioning of the economy. The oil 
crises in the 1970’s highlighted the effect of constrained energy supplies on 
economies which led to energy security being defined as the need to secure access 
to oil supplies. Since then, the potential for reserve depletion of both oil and natural 
gas and the smooth functioning of the energy supply chain have also come to be 
included in energy security or security of supply definitions.  
Present day definitions tend to incorporate four elements; namely, availability (the 
geological element), accessibility (the geopolitical element), affordability (the cost 
element), and acceptability (the environmental element) which allow analysis of the 
structural aspects of the system (Kruyt et al., 2009). Capturing this analysis within 
indicators has included using resource estimates, reserves to production ratios, 
diversity indices, import dependence, political stability, energy price, mean variance 
portfolio theory, share of zero-carbon fuels, market liquidity, demand-side 
indicators, and a number of composites including a mix of the above (Kruyt et al., 
2009).  Many of the metrics require subjective and context-dependent inputs which 
may call into question the effectiveness of results. A case in point is a relatively 
recent piece of work evaluating energy security in the Asia-Pacific region which 
analysed 44 attributes including subjective measures like estimations of ‘exposure 
to social or cultural energy-related risks’ such as NIMBYism and ‘human security 
issues addressed in policy’ to calculate energy security (Vivoda, 2010). Other 
research included a reduced number of metrics (20), but included metrics like forest 30 
 
cover as an indicator of environmental sustainability and quality of information as 
an indicator of regulation and governance (Sovacool et al., 2011), which it is argued 
here are indicators of country sustainability rather than energy security.  
Discussions involving security and electricity supply have tended to focus on 
diversity of supply (Stirling, 1994, Stirling, 2010), with forays into the implications of 
carbon emission constraints on diversity (Grubb et al., 2006), and security of supply 
in liberalized markets (Rodilla and Batlle, 2012, Joskow, 2006) rather than a broader 
view of the process of transforming energy into electricity for consumption.  One of 
the few discussions that does look to the security of electricity generation, is a case 
study of the fossil-fuel dependence and vulnerability for selected European 
countries (Bhattacharyya, 2009). This discussion revolves around a vulnerability 
indicator which is calculated as a composite of fuel price, generation efficiency, fuel 
dependence, electricity as percentage of energy demanded and energy intensity. 
The study’s use of fuel price to derive a fuel bill for power generation as a 
proportion of GDP renders the calculation of vulnerability to be extremely sensitive 
to price. It would be preferable to have the underlying factors derive the 
vulnerability or otherwise of the electricity system because, theoretically, price 
should provide the value metric of the electricity system as a composite of all 
underlying factors. A further concern with the study is that it addresses only the 
vulnerability to specific fuel risks rather than the vulnerability of the entire 
electricity supply chain.  
By contrast, the Resilience Index is a more transparent measure of the electricity 
system than the composite energy security indices and a broader measure than the 31 
 
measures of electricity security. Like the IEA’s discussion on security of supply in 
electricity markets, it is concerned with having adequate infrastructure to meet the 
needs of the economy (IEA, 2002), but it is also concerned with the other 
vulnerabilities that might affect either the physical supply of power or the 
affordability of that power, like non-renewable fuel supply, emissions, efficiency 
and diversity. In fact, with the increased use of renewable energy comes 
unpredictable localized constraints which make diversity and efficient transmission 
systems imperatives for a secure electricity supply.  
Whilst the Resilience Index measures the four elements within the general 
definition of energy security, it does so without the inclusion of subjective 
measures, for instance: 
  With respect to the availability element, there is no attempt to predict 
future resource use, production, extraction and depletion of non-renewable 
resources as these will all lead to subjective estimates; instead what is 
measured is non-renewable resource dependence to ascertain the 
vulnerability to future threats. In addition, like many energy security metrics, 
diversity is included because it measures an important hedge against supply 
constraints, but there are no subjective limits or thresholds included in the 
calculation of diversity. 
  With the acceptability element, there is no attempt to predict global action 
on climate change mitigation; quantity of carbon emissions associated with 
electricity supply instead provides an indication of vulnerability to future 
environmental requirements.   32 
 
  Accessibility to fuels and electricity is measured by reliance on imports for 
electricity and redundant electricity for use in the economy. Reliance on 
imports is an important measure of exposure to supply constraints but 
consistent with our avoidance of the inclusion of subjective measures there 
has been no weighting based on potential political risks; the metric instead 
focuses only on the dependence on imports.   Redundant electricity for use 
in the economy measures the buffer within the system against demand 
surges thus rendering unnecessary the requirement for a metric to measure 
exposure to demand-side risks.  
  Affordability is addressed by measuring efficiency in generation and 
distribution which indicates the excess cost that is being paid by consumers 
and constrains use.  In mapping price to the Resilience Index, we incorporate 
price as an essential measure of value of the electricity system. 
In line with our avoidance of the inclusion of subjective measures, thresholds for 
normalization are endogenously calculated, and except for the weighting of non-
renewable generation efficiency to allow for the dependence on non-renewable 
generation, there is no weighting of the seven indices that comprise the composite 
Resilience Index. We realize that even the decision to exclude weighting introduces 
an element of subjectivity to the calculation of the composite index, but this 
decision at least is transparent.  
Using endogenously calculated thresholds for normalisation may solve the problem 
of subjectivity but it could introduce a measure of bias if there is global 
homogeneity of energy source or technology, which would affect the ability of the 33 
 
index to predict vulnerability. However, electricity systems have evolved based 
primarily on the affordable exploitation of local resources which has introduced 
heterogeneity into electricity systems, and ensures that the normalization of 
measures is not adversely affected.  
The Resilience Index is not intended as an investment decision tool, providing a 
probabilistic approach to decision making under uncertainty. Its strength lies more 
in its ability to highlight vulnerability to stochastic events, which will have economic 
and social consequences. Instead of applying probabilities to risks which may or 
may not be identifiable, it accepts that society is ignorant today of potential 
changes to fuel supply, innovation and social and economic preferences far into the 
future. Instead it focuses on disparate measures which reflect the diversity, 
efficiency or adequacy of each step in the process of transforming energy into 
consumed electricity relative to other countries. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
Resilience Index does not attempt to assign probabilities to potential risks or 
calculate something along the lines of mean variance portfolio, it does indicate a 
cost-risk frontier along which countries and electricity-intensive companies might 
seek to converge for competitive advantage.  
6. The Resilience Index’s ability to predict shifts in electricity-
intensive industry 
6.1. A little history on the alumina/aluminium industry 
The discovery of a process to unlock alumina from bauxite by an American, Charles 
Martin Hall, and the subsequent formation of the Aluminum Company of America 34 
 
(ALCOA), meant that the USA dominated world production and supply until the 
1960s. The USSR had, at the same time, built up production for domestic use but 
Japan muscled into the market as aluminium became a component of vehicles, 
construction, packaging and beverage cans. However, the major cost of aluminium 
production is electricity, comprising between 25 and 40% of the cost of producing 
an ingot (Metal Bulletin Monthly, 2007), which is why the first oil shock in 1973 
resulted in major structural change in global aluminium production.  
With 73% of power sourced from oil and 82% of electricity reliant on imports, 
Japan’s power system in 1973 was extremely vulnerable to sharp increases in the 
price of oil. Japan’s alumina and aluminium processing industry produced 8% and 
9% respectively of the world supply  in 1973, but by 1990 alumina production had 
declined from 2.1 million to 0.5 million tons and alumiunium from 1.2 million to 
34,000 tons. Increased electricity prices presaged a trend to reduce costs by 
constructing alumina plants near bauxite mines to reduce bulk transportation costs, 
and locating aluminium smelters close to sources of low cost power supplies(USGS, 
2011a).  
Australia and Brazil were the early beneficiaries of the trend to locating alumina 
plants close to bauxite mines and low-cost power. Australia’s production of alumina 
jumped from 4.4 million tons and 15% of world production in 1973 to 11.2 million 
tons and 26% of world production by 1990. Aluminium production too had grown to 
6% in Australia and 5% in Brazil in 1990 in the wake of the exodus of the aluminium 
industry from Japan. Russia, under the USSR, continued to increase production, not 
for international trade but for domestic use, growing from 1.5 million tons in 1973 35 
 
to 3.5 million tons in 1990. With the demise of the USSR, and the collapse of 
domestic demand, Russia was to be accused of ‘dumping’ when it started exporting 
its surplus aluminium at very low prices in 1994(Kuckshinrichs and Poganietz, 2006). 
Although not as dramatic as Japan’s declining aluminium industry, the United States 
also saw a general decline between 1973 and 1990 in its share of global production. 
US bauxite production had all but halted by 1990 making the USA susceptible to 
increasing transport costs to import bauxite for the production of alumina. Aged US 
aluminium plants had high operating costs and low energy efficiencies, making 
them vulnerable to closure. By 1990 the USA produced only 12% of world alumina 
and 21% of aluminium down from 26% and 34% respectively in 1973 (USGS, 2011a).  
The following two decades, from 1990 to 2009, showed more dramatic decline in 
production of alumina/aluminium in the USA and a shift to Canada, Australia, Brazil 
and South Africa. India started producing alumina/aluminium from domestic 
bauxite, and China satisfied growth in global demand increasing production of 
aluminium from 850,000 tons in 1990 to 12.9 million tons and 35% of global market 
share in 2009. Notably, by 2009 production had not decreased in OECD Europe or 
Russia although market shares had. 
6.2.  The Resilience Index and aluminium 
Could the Resilience Index have predicted these shifts in aluminium processing?  
There are data quality issues going as far back as 1973, but we can look at trends. 
The Resilience Index calculated for 1973 shows that Japan’s power system had low 
resilience. It was also expensive. Japan was vulnerable to the shock that was about 36 
 
to strike the electricity system in the form of constrained oil supply and the 
associated price increases.  
In the mid 1970s there was little concern with carbon dioxide emissions, so 
decisions taken to move industry would have been based on the price of electricity 
and the abundant supply of electricity from domestic sources. With the global 
slowdown that curtailed aluminium demand in the early 1980s, aluminium 
companies sought competitive advantage by negotiating extremely low tariffs from 
countries eager for development investment (Kellow, 1995).  For the more strategic, 
it was especially far-sighted to shift production to electricity systems, like Canada 
and Brazil, with their high proportion of hydro electricity (even though Canada had 
no bauxite). It should be noted though, that the Resilience Index for Brazil declines 
around 1990 due to a lack of spare capacity (electricity consumption of non-ferrous 
metals had increased by 20tWh since 1973). The Resilience Index could have 
forewarned of the impending crisis as a result of reduced reserve levels brought on 
by drought in 2000. 
Figure 18: Resilience Index 1973  
Source: (EIA, 2012), (IEA 2011d) 37 
 
So, in 2009, what would the Resilience Index have been predicting? Based on the 
relative resilience and the potential cost associated with carbon emissions, 
aluminium production reliant on fossil fuel electricity generation in South Africa, 
India, Australia and China would be threatened. Chinese smelters have recently 
experienced this when  the Chinese Government ordered the discontinuance of 
preferential power rates to energy-intensive industries and the closure of polluting 
or inefficient smelters (USGS, 2011a). New capacity announced in Canada, Iceland, 
Norway and Russia should be secure due to the use of hydro or geothermal power, 
but it is suggested here that growth in aluminium capacity in China and India will be 
halted unless the smelters are powered by renewable energy. 
6.3.  The Resilience Index and copper refining 
Whilst copper refining uses about half of the electricity required for aluminium 
smelting (UN Centre on Transnational Corporations, 1992), it is also an electricity-
intensive industry. Traditionally, copper has been smelted and refined close to 
copper mines unless there was limited access to energy. With large deposits of 
copper, the USA mined and processed its copper for local consumption. However, 
after 1990 as a result of declining ore quality and quantity, copper refining in the 
Figure 19: Global share of aluminium smelting 1973 to 2009 (resilience: 1973, 2009) 
Source: USGS, IEA, EIA, WorldBank, IAEA 38 
 
USA diminished and shifted to Chile with its large deposits of ore. Chile’s copper 
refining has grown from 525,000 tons in 1973 to 3.27 million tons in 2009 (USGS, 
2011b).This was possible because Chile has hydro power with gas generation to 
insure against drought. Japan, on the other hand, had small deposits of copper and 
a less resilient electricity system, so it is remarkable that Japanese refining of 
copper has not decreased even if it has lost global market share. Without copper, 
however, the Japanese manufacturing sectors of consumer electronics, automobile 
manufacture and semi-conductor manufacture would have been threatened.  It is 
possible then, that copper refining has remained in Japan, because fierce domestic 
and international competition in those industries have improved productivity 
(Yosuke, 2005), with steady technology improvements in highly technical industries 
underpinning the Japanese economy (Tanuwidjaja and Thangavelu, 2007). 
 
China’s economy too is underpinned by manufacturing including consumer 
electronics, importing 3 million tons of copper ore in 2009.  Copper refining has 
increased from 560,000 tons in 1990 to 4.2 million tons in 2009 (USGS, 2011b), a 
Figure 20: Global share of copper refining 1973 to 2009 (resilience: 1973 , 2009) 
Source: USGS, IEA, IAEA, Worldbank 39 
 
monumental growth achievable because of China’s low-cost electricity. China 
however has been struggling to keep electricity prices down, because of a surge in 
coal prices and is preparing for power shortages as a result (SP-China, 2011).  In 
2009, the Resilience Index places China’s electricity system behind the majority of 
its competitors, its competitive position bolstered by its low-cost.  If China is unable 
to cap electricity price rises, then Chinese manufacturers will face higher costs and 
have to find increased productivity gains to remain competitive, like Japan has had 
to do. 
6.4. How successful is the Resilience Index at predicting shifts? 
The Resilience Index has some success at predicting the trends in locating 
aluminium processing. The Resilience Index calculated for 1973 shows that Japan 
did not have a resilient power system. As a result of the oil shocks in the 1970s and 
the subsequent global economic slow-down, Japan’s lack of resilience in power, 
resulted in its loss of the aluminium industry. The USA’s power system resilience, 
improved by hydroelectricity which underpins a substantial portion of smelting 
capacity (US Department of Energy, 2007), has slowed the process of disinvestment 
in aluminium processing in the USA. The Resilience Index shows Canada’s power 
system as highly resilient and competitively priced since 1973, which explains the 
increase in aluminium processing in Canada despite Canada having no local bauxite 
deposits (although questions have been asked in Canada about whether the 
hydroelectricity would be better exported to the USA than used in aluminium 
smelting (Bélanger and Bernard, 1991)). The Resilience Index also shows Brazil and 
Chile as having resilient power systems which has facilitated the investment in 
aluminium and copper refining respectively, in those countries. OECD Europe’s 40 
 
power system has increased its resilience since 1973, which has helped it maintain 
its production of both aluminium and copper refining. 
The Resilience Index would not have predicted an increase in processing of 
aluminium in Australia, China, India and South Africa although the low-cost of 
electricity offered to aluminium companies appears to have been very successful in 
encouraging investment in those countries over the last few decades. It is apparent 
though, that the low cost offered in Australia was subsidised (Simshauser, 2001, 
Kellow, 1995), and that Australia, China, and South Africa will face significant cost 
pressures in the future as a result of their reduced resilience, which will threaten 
aluminium processing in those countries.  
The Resilience Index would also have not predicted continued processing of copper 
in Japan, except that Japanese manufacturing had to find productivity gains in order 
to counteract the higher cost of power after the oil crises of the 1970s.  Japan’s 
power system today is considerably more resilient than it was in 1973, and this 
improvement has helped it retain its copper refining industry. 
It would appear then that the Resilience Index has some success at predicting the 
trends in aluminium processing and the need for productivity gains in 
manufacturing to maintain copper refining. It is suggested here that the Resilience 
Index can provide an early warning system of future price increases and/or 
disruptions and for this reason is a good measure of the ability of a power system to 
withstand future shocks. 41 
 
7. Conclusion 
Although there are plenty of renewable energy resources, current institutional 
structures see little value in capturing renewable energy and using it effectively. 
Energy service security therefore has become a concern because of continued 
reliance on non-renewable sources of energy unequally dispersed around the 
world. Long term energy security should therefore be characterized by 
decentralization and the use of indigenous, renewable resources for energy service 
delivery (O’Brien and Hope, 2010). 
Resilience is a proactive approach that seeks to counteract vulnerability. 
Geopolitical tensions, reliance on non-renewable resources and the threat of 
climate change are the harbingers of change to energy service delivery although we 
are ignorant of the specifics of how this will unfold. For this reason, a good 
understanding of the vulnerabilities in our energy services provides the opportunity 
to diversify away from the inherent risks toward greater security.  
Electricity is a convenient, versatile energy carrier. It can absorb energy from a 
multitude of sources and can be transported relatively cheaply over large distances. 
Electricity is therefore critical to the efficient use of energy (Jansen and Seebregts, 
2010). The challenge for policy makers and stakeholders is to recognise the signals 
of impending change and to devise solutions that can transform the power system 
before the power system is subject to change that it cannot respond to fast enough. 
The Resilience Index for electricity systems, as devised here, provides a long-term, 
strategic tool for assessment of electricity systems and their risk profile, and thus 
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